美國移民局關于TEA到底是如何認定的？為什么最繁華的地區(qū)會是TEA？

　　引言：TEA的基本定義為：人口少于2萬的城市郊區(qū)或失業(yè)率高于全國平均水平150%的地區(qū)。于是人們形成這樣的印象，TEA就是貧困地區(qū)。很多人更疑問，為什么像紐約曼哈頓這樣的地區(qū)會是TEA地區(qū)?下面推薦閱讀的這篇文章提供了解釋這個問題的要點，就是：1. 繁華但失業(yè)率高的地區(qū)可以是TEA;2. 高失業(yè)率是可以通過組合不同的就業(yè)統(tǒng)計區(qū)塊而產(chǎn)生;3. 這種組合由州政府進行，不同的州政府有不同的標準，美國移民局是認同州政府的組合結果的。

　　原文作者：Suzanne Lazicki 美國EB-5項目文案策劃專家，以下為兆龍移民原文翻譯：

　　對于EB-5美國投資移民計劃來說，每過幾年都會出現(xiàn)關于目標就業(yè)區(qū)(TEA)的使用和定義的爭論。有人(例如最近的《西雅圖時報》記者)會關注那些建造在富人聚集的市中心區(qū)域而使用EB-5投資款的豪華酒店，并且會質(zhì)疑該等項目的可行性。諸如此類的項目幾乎總能獲得以50萬美元為累加單位的EB-5投資款(美國國務院數(shù)據(jù)顯示，歷史上的區(qū)域中心投資極少有以100萬美元為門檻的)，而最低50萬美元的投資金額則取決于項目是否位于TEA范圍內(nèi)�！段餮艌D時報》認為，TEA地區(qū)50萬美元的投資額成為了被某些人利用的漏洞，這些人擅自將高失業(yè)率和低失業(yè)率地區(qū)捏合成一個TEA，然后在指定區(qū)域的繁華地段開發(fā)項目。該報編輯認為，EB-5美國投資移民計劃創(chuàng)建者的本意是將EB-5投資款投入到那些經(jīng)濟蕭條的社區(qū)，但對于如何定義TEA并沒有形成統(tǒng)一的指導方針，而且各州參與TEA指定也存在問題。這些問題都值得考慮一番。

　　首先，“目標就業(yè)區(qū)”一詞的確有固定的定義，該定義已由美國國會通過法律予以明確并在美國移民局的規(guī)程中得到了詳細闡述。該詞并非僅由各州進行自行定義，也絕非等同于“經(jīng)濟蕭條區(qū)域”。根據(jù)創(chuàng)建了EB-5美國投資移民計劃的1990年《移民法》的定義(僅局限于該法定義)，“目標就業(yè)區(qū)”一詞的含義是，“在投資發(fā)生之時，一個農(nóng)村區(qū)域或一個高失業(yè)率(至少高于全國平均水平的150%)地區(qū)”，及“在投資發(fā)生于目標就業(yè)區(qū)內(nèi)的情況下，司法部長可以依據(jù)小節(jié)(A)限定一個低于(i)款規(guī)定的投資數(shù)額(但不得低于該數(shù)額的一半)(詳見1990年《移民法》PDF件第21-22頁)”。美國移民局的規(guī)章和政策反復強調(diào)了這一法定定義，明確了最低投資金額，并闡述了有關指定確認的實際問題(詳見《EB-5政策備忘錄》第7-8頁的討論)。

　　由于TEA定義已被寫入法律，因此改變定義便成為了一項法定事宜，且需要與國會代表進行討論。但了解一下TEA定義的原本意圖還是值得的。1990年，美國國會決定根據(jù)具體就業(yè)情況(農(nóng)村地區(qū))來對EB-5美國投資移民計劃的TEA地區(qū)進行定義。國會原本也可以采用貧困水平、犯罪率、教育程度、出口率、GDP增長率、營業(yè)稅或其它旨在使經(jīng)濟蕭條地區(qū)受益的衡量標準，但最后國會選擇的是失業(yè)率。一個中位家庭收入達到3萬美元且失業(yè)率為7%的地區(qū)目前不能被認定為TEA地區(qū);而另一個中位家庭收入達到10萬美元且失業(yè)率為15%的地區(qū)則可以被認定為TEA地區(qū)。顯然，TEA的意圖是鼓勵在高失業(yè)地區(qū)創(chuàng)造就業(yè)。為窮人創(chuàng)造就業(yè)機會以及將投資置于貧困地區(qū)同樣是值得追求的目標，但國會偏偏沒有把這些目標寫進EB-5法律。

　　盡管法律和規(guī)章對TEA進行了定義，但具體實施還需要各州的參與。各州可以選擇一個機構并授予其指定TEA地區(qū)的權力，這需要充分的時間來判定(1)構成目標就業(yè)區(qū)的合理地理邊界或政治分區(qū)，及(2)計算該地區(qū)的失業(yè)率使用何等數(shù)據(jù)。在審理EB-5申請案件時，美國移民局通常遵從各州的指定，但會復核所用的數(shù)據(jù)是否可被接受，以及所用的計算方法是否與各州勞工部確定的方法論一致。各州自行指定涉及的各種因素導致了各州對于TEA指定的差異。有些州立機構會指定人口普查區(qū)組，而有些州則不會;各州對于地理邊界的界定也會采用不同的方法;而且一系列不同的失業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)集都可能會被使用。(可參考Impact DataSource關于各州TEA指定異同的文章)因此，如果由一個機構使用統(tǒng)一的標準會使TEA指定變得更清晰、簡單和公平。但同時也需要注意，由當?shù)貐⑴c指定最重要的參考依據(jù)是什么。例如，如果根據(jù)人口分布和通勤模式進行指定，TEA地區(qū)可以是一個包含郊區(qū)的很大一片區(qū)域，也可以是某個很小的居住區(qū)，或者還可以是在某條車流密集的高速公路旁某處的一片呈香蕉形的區(qū)域。當?shù)氐慕?jīng)濟開發(fā)部門是可以有依據(jù)判定某個地區(qū)的TEA邊界是否合理的。但我無法設想某個聯(lián)邦機構可以在美國任何地方找出曲奇成型刀形的TEA地理邊界。指定的州立機構一般都是各州的勞工部或經(jīng)濟開發(fā)署，而這些機構的利益都是與EB-5計劃的目標相一致的，這就使得它們所做的裁決足夠合理。當然項目開發(fā)商也會試圖劃分有利于其的地理邊界，但我實在想不出有比州立機構更好的裁決者了。

　　根據(jù)目前的規(guī)定，如果某個地區(qū)的平均失業(yè)率保持高位，那么即便該地區(qū)的局部區(qū)域的失業(yè)率較低，該地區(qū)仍可能被認定為TEA區(qū)域。如果是這樣的話，我們該如何看待那些位于TEA失業(yè)率最低區(qū)域的EB-5美國投資移民項目?這樣的項目是不是顛覆了EB-5計劃的初衷?《西雅圖時報》認為，位于西雅圖市中心TEA地區(qū)的EB-5美國投資移民項目并不合格。我們可以拿Potala Tower項目舉例。根據(jù)《西雅圖時報》的消息，這是一個位于Belltown高端居住區(qū)、造價高達1.9億美元的酒店項目。(事實上除了該報提供的消息，我對該項目一無所知)我認為Belltown并非經(jīng)濟蕭條區(qū)域，而緊鄰Potala項目的時尚人士也并不需要該項目創(chuàng)造的建筑就業(yè)或運營就業(yè)崗位。而且，這些時尚人士也不太可能會接受這些就業(yè)崗位。相比之下，接受這些崗位的屋頂工、木匠、管家和管理人員更可能成為位于南部幾英里之外的較普通且失業(yè)率較高的居住區(qū)的居民。如果Potala Tower項目雇用西雅圖南部的居民，那么將西雅圖南部的居住區(qū)和Belltown一同視為目標就業(yè)區(qū)是否合理呢?這顯然是一個捏造出來的目標就業(yè)區(qū)，但如果Belltown周圍有能夠?qū)⒃谠摰貏?chuàng)造的就業(yè)和消費隔離開來的屏障，那么從經(jīng)濟角度來看是這么做是可行的。我們還可以試著將造價1.9億美元的Potala Tower項目的影響與可能會在西雅圖南部的蕭條地區(qū)創(chuàng)造就業(yè)、造價900萬美元的Econolodge項目的影響進行比較。豪華酒店可能會成為更大的新雇傭方，但卻坐落于離大多數(shù)失業(yè)人群的居住區(qū)更遠的地方。假設我代表的是西雅圖南部20%失業(yè)居民的利益，且不得不代表他們選擇支持其中一個項目——Potala或Econolodge，那么我必須仔細斟酌，甚至可能咨詢所在州的經(jīng)濟開發(fā)署。這不是一個簡單的問題，我會追究高檔商業(yè)不能位于下層街區(qū)的原因。設想，如果Belltown和西雅圖南部地區(qū)可以被合理且實際地稱為“地區(qū)”，而且Potala Tower可以坐落在西雅圖南部的高失業(yè)地區(qū)的話，那么我就不會如此不看好這個項目了。根據(jù)EB-5美國投資移民計劃現(xiàn)行的規(guī)定，一個位于TEA地區(qū)的EB-5項目不應僅由于它的豪華特性或位于高端居住區(qū)這一事實而被否決，而否決的唯一原因只能是項目無法在高失業(yè)地區(qū)創(chuàng)造就業(yè)機會。

　　或許也有人認為現(xiàn)行的TEA規(guī)定設定的標準過低，使得太多地區(qū)都能被認定為TEA地區(qū);或者認為鑒于其它國家的投資者簽證門檻，50萬美元的EB-5投資額過低;或者認為TEA定義錯誤地將關注點聚焦在了失業(yè)上，而事實上有比失業(yè)更迫切需要關注的其它衡量標準。這些觀點都是值得討論的。除非你沒有領會現(xiàn)有的TEA定義和規(guī)定，否則我想你不會認為TEA定義和規(guī)定不存在、缺乏條理或在某些方面被顛覆了。為了避免無謂的爭論，不妨重讀一下Carolyn Lee寫的關于州立機構指定EB-5目標就業(yè)區(qū)的文章。

　　雖然我們目前討論的是有關TEA概念的誤解，但需要提醒的是，你也可以破費雇人確認你所在的區(qū)域是否可以被認定為TEA地區(qū)。各州對于TEA指定存在的差異意味著，不存在統(tǒng)一的數(shù)據(jù)源或某個簡單的計算方法來可靠地判定你所在的區(qū)域是否屬于TEA地區(qū)，除非你所在的整個縣或MSA(大都會統(tǒng)計區(qū))失業(yè)率較高，或者你位于MSA以外的農(nóng)村區(qū)域(這樣的情況下不需要任何特別指定)。例如，如果你所在的州不指定人口普查區(qū)組并使用2013年美國勞工統(tǒng)計局或2011年美國社區(qū)調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)，那么購買一份根據(jù)2014年失業(yè)專用數(shù)據(jù)預測的符合要求的人口普查區(qū)組就不是那么明智的選擇了。如果對于你所在的區(qū)域是否屬于TEA地區(qū)有疑問的話，建議你向你所在地的指定機構獲取政策信息。然后你就可以進行TEA資格評估，并可考慮求助于那些研究你所在州地理區(qū)域規(guī)程和失業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)集的專業(yè)人士。

　　原文鏈接：

　　http://blog.lucidtext.com/2015/03/19/what-are-teas-and-how-do-they-work/

　　英文原文：

　　Every couple years, there’s a kerfuffle over the use and definition of the Targeted Employment Area (TEA) in the EB-5 program. People – recently Seattle Times journalists, for example – look at things like luxury hotels being built in wealthy downtown areas using EB-5 investment and ask wait a minute, is this right? Such projects nearly always get EB-5 investment in $500,000 increments (State Department stats show there’ve historically been very few Regional Center investments at the $1 million level), and the $500,000 reduced investment amount depends on the project being located within a TEA. The Seattle Times portrays the TEA reduced investment amount as a “loophole” being “exploited” by people who “gerrymander” a TEA by grouping high and low unemployment areas, then go on to develop a project in the prosperous part of the designated area. The Seattle Times editors believe that EB-5 program architects intended EB-5 investment dollars to be spent within depressed communities, that there aren’t centralized guidelines for defining TEAs, and that there’s a problem with state involvement in TEA designation. These points require some perspective.

　　First, the term “Targeted Employment Area” does have a set definition, articulated by Congress through law and elaborated by USCIS regulation. The term is not defined individually by states, and the term is not defined to equal “an economically depressed area.” The Immigration Act of 1990 that established the EB-5 program specifies that (in its own spelling): “the term ‘targetted employment area’ means, at the time of the investment, a rural area or an area which has experienced high unemployment (of at least 150 percent of the national average rate)” and “-The Attorney General may, in the case of investment made in a targetted employment area, specify an amount of capital required under subparagraph (A) that is less than (but not less than 1/2 of) the amount specified in clause (i)” (see PDF p 21-22 of IMMACT 1990). USCIS regulations and policy repeat this statutory definition, specify the reduced amount of capital, and elaborate practical issues in designation determinations (see the EB-5 Policy Memo p. 7-8 for discussion).

　　Because the TEA definition is in the law, changing the definition would be a statutory matter and a point to pursue with your Congressional representatives. But it’s worthwhile to look at the original intent. In 1990, Congress chose to define TEAs for the EB-5 program specifically in terms of employment (or rural areas). Congress could have defined TEAs based on poverty levels, crime levels, educational levels, exports, GDP growth rates, sales tax, or other metrics considered in other initiatives intended to benefit depressed areas, but it chose unemployment as the target. An area with median household income at $30,000 and unemployment of 7% would not currently qualify as a TEA; another area with median income at $100,000 and unemployment of 15% could qualify. The explicit intent with TEAs was to encourage job creation for high unemployment areas. Creating jobs for poor people and investing within poor neighborhoods are also worthy goals, but it happens that Congress did not choose to write such goals into the EB-5 law.

　　While the law and regulations define what constitutes a TEA, states are involved in implementation. Each state may choose an agency and give it authority to designate TEAs, which involves leeway to judge (1) appropriate boundaries of a geographic or political subdivision that constitutes the targeted employment area; and (2) which data set to use in calculating the area’s unemployment. In reviewing EB-5 petitions, USCIS generally gives deference to state designations, but double-checks that the data is acceptable and that calculations are consistent with methodologies established by the Department of Labor. The elements of state discretion lead to variation in TEA designations between states. Some state authorities will designate census tract groups and some won’t; states have different ways of deciding which geographic boundaries make sense; and a variety of unemployment data sets may be used. (Impact DataSource has a good article about state variation.) Just letting one agency decide for the nation using one yardstick would look cleaner, simpler, and more equal. But note what makes sense about local involvement. Based on population distribution and commuting patterns, for example, it might be reasonable to have a very large TEA area spanning certain suburbs, a very small one within a certain city neighborhood, and a banana-shaped one somewhere else along a busy highway. A local economic development agency could have a good basis for judging whether certain TEA boundaries make sense for the given region. I can’t visualize a federal agency coming up with one cookie cutter geography definition that fits from Alaska to Florida. Designated state agencies are typically labor departments or economic development authorities, which means their interests are aligned with the aims of the EB-5 program, making their discretion is as good as anyone’s. Of course project developers will try to draw geographic areas for their own advantage, but I can’t think of a better arbiter for this than the state authorities.

　　Under current rules, it’s possible to get TEA designation for an area whose average unemployment rate is high, even if parts of the area have low unemployment. So how do we feel about locating an EB-5 project in the healthiest part of the TEA? Would that subvert the intent of the EB-5 program? The Seattle Times suggests that TEA EB-5 projects in downtown Seattle fail the smell test. Let’s think about Potala Tower, which the Seattle Times describes as a $190 million hotel project in an upscale Belltown neighborhood. (Disclosure: I don’t know any more about this project than I learned from the Times.) I believe that Belltown is not depressed and that the hipsters living next door to the Potala project do not need the construction jobs or operations jobs that it will create. On the other hand, the hipsters next door probably won’t take the jobs. It seems more likely that the roofers and carpenters and housekeepers and managers who take the work will be residents of the less hip high-unemployment neighborhoods a few miles south. If Potala Tower would likely employ South Seattle residents, isn’t it reasonable to package those contiguous South Seattle neighborhoods with Belltown as a Targeted Employment Area? That’s gerrymandering, but could make economic sense, unless there’s a barrier around Belltown that isolates the jobs created and money spent there. And let’s consider the impacts of the $190 million Potala Tower project as compared with impacts of the $9 million Econolodge project that might be feasible to build smack within a depressed part of South Seattle. The luxury hotel would be a much larger new employer, but more distant from where most unemployed people reside. If I were advocating for those 20% unemployed residents of South Seattle and had to choose one project to encourage on their behalf, the Potala or the Econolodge, I’d have to consider carefully – maybe even in consultation with my good old state economic development authority. It’s not a simple question, and I wouldn’t bother asking why the upscale business can’t just locate to a downscale street. Assuming that Belltown+South Seattle can reasonably, practically be called “an area,” and that Potala Tower could make a dent in the high unemployment concentrated in South Seattle, I’m not getting bad whiffs off this situation. As the EB-5 program is currently set up, a TEA EB-5 project should not fail the smell test simply because it’s luxury or in an upscale neighborhood, but only if it seems unlikely to create jobs in a high-unemployment area.

　　It’s possible to argue that the current TEA rules set a bar that’s too low, allowing too many areas to qualify; or that the $500,000 reduced EB-5 investment amount is too low, considering investor visa thresholds in other countries; or that the TEA definition wrongly focuses on unemployment when other metrics may be more urgent today. Those points are worth debating. I don’t think you can argue that TEA definitions and rules do not exist or are incoherent or endemically subverted, unless you begin by not grasping what the existing definitions and rules are. To avoid debating from ignorance, consider re-reading Carolyn Lee’s article on State Designations of EB-5 Targeted Employment Areas.

　　And while I’m on the topic of TEA misconceptions, let me caution you about paying someone to “discover if your site qualifies as a TEA.” The variation among states means that, unless your entire county or MSA has high unemployment or you’re in a rural area outside an MSA (in which case, no special designation is required), there is no universal data source or one simple calculation that will reliably determine a TEA around your site. It’s not very helpful to buy a report predicting a favorable census tract combination based on proprietary 2014 unemployment data, for example, if your state won’t designate census tract groups and uses 2013 BLS/2011 ACS data. If in doubt about TEA possibilities for your site, I’d start by getting the policy from your area’s designated authority (there’s one list of designated agencies here). Then you can start assessing TEA qualification, and consider assistance from professionals who are current on your state’s geographic area procedures and unemployment data sets.